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[T]he phrase [self-determination] is simply loaded with dyna-
mite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized.1
Ethnic violence pervades the news, from Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Republics to Sri Lanka, Eritrea, and India. Although some ethnic struggles
concern issues of domestic political fairness, many involve secessionist
claims. Secessionist demands, unlike claims about domestic political fair-
ness, cannot be satisfied through domestic political reforms. Instead, they
aim to redraw the political boundaries. Because secessionist movements call
for international recognition of the states they seek to create, they necessar-
ily concern the world community. The right to secede is a matter of inter-
national law.
International law provides no easy answer to the problem of separatist
movements. Instead, as in so many other areas, opposing principles seem
to come in complementary pairs. Two inconsistent themes run throughout
the academic discussions, one supporting a right of secession and the other
denying it. On the one hand, the principle of self-determination of peoples
suggests that every "people" has a right to its own nation-state? While the
positive law status of this norm and its applicability to the secessionist
context are debatable,3 on a rhetorical level few deny the principle's ap-
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1. R. LANSING, THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, A PERSONAL NARRATIVE 97 (1921).
2. Some United Nations documents supporting a right of self-determination are set out in note 5
below, and in the accompanying text.
3. Michla Pomerance, for example, doubts that there is a "right" to self-determination. M.
POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATIONIN LAW AND PRACTICE71 (1982) ("Thesuggestion that self-determina-
tion is a principle ofjus cogens is thus seen to be without any firm legal foundation"). Others claim that
there is a legal right to self-determination. See, e.g., H. Wn.sON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE BY NATIONAL LmERATION MOVEMENTS 78 (1988). Wilson, it should be noted, does not argue that
there exists a legal right of secession. ld. at 88. Indeed, it is quite possible to argue that a right to self-
determination exists but not to support a right of secession.
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peal. Unfortunately, it seems directly contrary to another, equally venera-
ble, principle of international law, which upholds the territorial integrity of
existing states.4 In secessionist struggles, it seems, one principle or the
other must give way. Where a secessionist movement establishes th~t its
people do not currently possess a nation-state of their own, the first princi-
ple would require that the existing territorial boundaries be redrawn, but
this redrawing would violate the territorial integrity of the existing state. IT,
conversely, territorial integrity takes priority, then minority groups within
the existing state will be denied their cherished claims to independence.s
Or at least, so goes the standard account.6
I argue here that, contrary to popular assumptions, the difficult norma-
tive issues arising out of secessionist claims do not involve an incompatibil-
ity of the territorial integrity and rights of peoples arguments. In fact, these
arguments do not pose the inconsistencies normally assumed of them.7
Secessionist claims involve, first and foremost, disputed claims to territory.
Ethnicity primarily identifies the people making the disputed territorial
claim. The two supposedly competing principles of people and territory
actually work in tandem.
This reinterpretation of secessionist movements alters the equities some-
what. The plausibility of a separatist claim does not depend primarily on
the degree to which the group in question constitutes a distinct people in
4. Some United·Nations norms concerning territorial integrity are set out in note 6, infra.
5. The opponents of secession are probably correct as a matter of positive law. Thornberry, Self-
Detennination, Minorities, Human Rights:A ReviewofIntemationalInstrnments, 38 INT'L & COMPo L.Q.
867 (1989). Even if one accepts a right of self-determination in some contexts, this does not entail
acknowledging a right of secession. The principle of territorial integrity often explicitly qualifies United
Nations declarations recognizingself-determination.See, e.g., Declarationon the Granting ofIndependence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66,67, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 1514] ("Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the
national unity and the territorial integrity ofa country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations"); Declaration on Principles ofInternational Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter ofthe U.N., G.A. Res. 2625,
25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 124, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) ("Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs
shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or
in part, the territorial integrity or political unity ofsovereign and independent States conducting themselves
in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and
thus possessed ofa government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction
as to race, creed or colour").
6. For examples of arguments concerning the opposition between territorial integrity and a self-
determination right of secession, see Knight, Territory and People or People and Territory? Thoughts on
Postcolonial Self-Detennination, 6 INT'L POL. SCI. REv. 248 (1985); A. COBBAN, THE NATION STATB
AND NATIONAL SBLF DETERMINATION 136 (1969); M. POMERANCB, supra note 3, at 12. But see C. BBITZ,
POLITICAL THEoRY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 109 (1979).
7. The apparent inconsistency arises because two competing versions of the principle of territori-
ality can be discerned. Territoriality might be understood to require protection of the existing territorial
status quo. However, it might also include territorial arguments about why existing national boundaries
should be redrawn.
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accordance with relevant international norms. The normative force behind
secessionist arguments derives instead from a different source, namely the
right to territory that many ethnic groups claim to possess. Secession typi-
cally represents a remedy for past injustices. This historical territorial
analysis contrasts sharply with the traditional analysis of ethnic differentia-
tion. The currently accepted interpretation of self-determination claims
poses the wrong questions in evaluating the merits of particular secessionist
claims. It overlooks an important normative ingredient of the arguments
that secessionists make, and for this reason understates their claims.
In addition, the current rhetoric about self-determination in one respect
treats secessionists' arguments too generously. It suggests that the right to
secede flows naturally from principles of self-government such as those
embodied in the American Declaration of Independence and, the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. 8 This distinguished
lineage affords secessionist claims an undeserved opportunity to stake out
the high moral ground. Focusing secessionist disputes instead on disputed
claims to territory puts the competing groups on a more even rhetorical
par. The mere fact that the secessionist group constitutes a distinct people
does not by itself establish a right to secede. To be persuasive a separatist
argument must also present a territorial claim.
In fact, even upon cursory review, one finds that current separatist
claims include, as they must, claims to particular territory. Surprisingly,
existing norms of international law do not highlight the territorial claim but
focus instead on whether the aggrieved group constitutes a distinct people.
The phrase self-determination frames the separatist question in a misleading
way; it obscures the territorial aspects of the dispute. At issue is not a
relationship between peoples and states, but a relationship between people,
states, and territory. Separatist arguments make little sense unless interpret-
ed in a territorial light.
I. THE STANDARD ACCOUNT
The standard account bases claims to secede upon principles of self-
determination of peoples, according to which every nation or people has a
right to determine its own destiny.9 This notion of self-determination can
be traced to the American Revolution (and in particular to the Declaration
of Independence), but the development of the idea is more often attributed
8. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
9. This is reflected in the fact that the relevant international instruments refer to the self-determination
rights of "peoples. " See supra note 5.
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to the French Revo1ution. 1o Although this diffusionist and Euro-centric
view of the origin of the norm of self-determination remains subject to
criticism,l1 many scholars assume that the idea of self-determination
spread during the revolutionary turmoil in Europe from one state to anoth-
er, and from there to the colonized areas now part of the Third World.
How might the ideals of the French Revolution give rise to claims to
secession? The apparent answer is that the concept of popular sovereignty
can be understood to encompass the right to rebel against rule by another
national or ethnic group just as it includes a right to rebel against one's
own government. The principle of popular sovereignty seemingly justifies
both sorts of rebellion because both reject the theory that a monarch legiti-
mately has power over citizens by virtue of where they are situated rather
than by virtue of their consent. One author explains the relevance of the
ideals of the French Revolution to the problem of international self-deter-
mination as follows:
The history of self-determination is bound up with the history of the doctrine of
popular sovereignty proclaimed by the French Revolution: government should
be based on the will of the people, not on that of the monarch, and people not
content with the government of the country to which they belong should be able
to secede and organise themselves as they wish. This meant that the territorial
element in a political unit lost its feudal predominance in favour of the personal
element: people were not to be any more a mere appurtenance of the land. 12
Both the right of secession and the right to rebel against nonrepresentative
local leaders derived from the rejection of a supposedly feudal, territorial
sovereignty principle. The territorial principle was supplanted by a princi-
ple of government by the consent of the governed.
The notion of self-determination of peoples increased in prominence
after the end of the First World War. President Woodrow Wilson analo-
gized the principle to American ideals of democracy, promoting self-deter-
mination of peoples as the foreign extension of American norms of political
fairnessY Redrawing the map of Europe after the War, the victors tried
to respect ethnic boundaries -- at least with regard to the empires of the de-
feated nations. Self-determination had virtually no impact on the colonial
empires of the victorious powers.14
10. Sources linking the notion of self-determination to the American and French Revolutions include
D. RONEN, THE QUEST FOR SELF-DETERMINATION 1 (1979); H. WILSON, supra note 3, at 55-56.
11. See generally J. BLAUT, THE NATIONALQUESTION: DECOLONISINGTHE THEORY OF NATIONALISM
(1987).
12. A. SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGIIT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 17 (1973).
13. A. COBBAN, supra note 6, at 62-66.
14. Cobban noted this double standard applied by the victorious powers. A. COBBAN, supra note 6,
at 66-69; See also M. POMERANCE, supra note 3, at 5.
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Self-determination also found rhetorical support in Marxist-Leninist
theory, although Marxism-Leninism employed the concept, in substantial
part, merely strategically. 15 The principle of self-determination was used
to encourage colonized peoples to throw off alien (and, not coincidentally,
capitalist) .domination. In particular, promises of local autonomy proved
instrumental in achieving support for the Russian Revolution, for the tsars
had extended Russian power over a wide range of other nationalities. The
manner in which the communist government later reextended Russian
power over the newly freed nationalities is well known, and its ramifica-
tions are still becoming clear.16 But, for a while, it seemed that Wilson
and Lenin sounded a common theme, namely the freedom of peoples to
determine their own states as they pleased.
In its next incarnation, the concept of self-determination had a much
greater practical impact. After the Second World War the anti-colonial
movements in the Third World succeeded in dismantling imperial structures
in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere. Ideals ensconced in the United Nations
Charter, which recognized the goal of self-determination of peoples, along
with other United Nations instruments, lent important rhetorical support to
this process. Articles 1(2) and 55 of the United Nations Charter, for exam-
ple, both list "self-determination of peoples" as goals of the United Na-
tions. 17 Since the adoption of the United Nations Charter, the United Na-
tions has adopted several legal instruments significantly endorsing the right
of self-determination. For example, General Assembly Resolution 1514
states that:
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploita-
tion constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is. contrary to the Charter
of the United Nations and is an imp~iment to the promotion of world peace
and co-operation.
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development. 18
Six years later, the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights was adopted, stating that:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development. 19
IS. See W. CONNOR, THE NATIONAL QUESTIONIN MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY AND STRATEGY 45-46
(1984).
16. ld. at 392-407.
17. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2; ld. at art. 55.
18. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 5, at 66.
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, para. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 173.
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The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
makes the identical statement.20 Additionally, General Assembly Resolu-
tion 2625 states that:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely
to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue
their economic social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to
respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.21
These norms played an important rhetorical role in the decolonization
process. With time, however, the concept's inadequacies became more
apparent. The anti-colonial movements relied upon the ideal of self-deter-
mination in their struggles for independence, but some of the newly estab-
lished states showed little inclination to extend to their own minority groups
those same self-determination rights.22 The self-determination norm, if
taken at face value, seemed to require that states be willing to subdivide
indefinitely into an infinitely larger number of infinitely smaller political
entities.
The divergence between the new states' attitudes toward colonial pow-
ers and toward local secessionist groups did not pass unnoticed by Western
nations. Belgium proposed to specify that the self-determination norm
applied to both cases equally.23 The United Nations rejected this proposal
and adopted in its place a "salt water" theory of colonialism.24 Inclusion .
of unwilling nationalities was illegitimate only if the state and its colony
were geographically separated. The Organization of African Unity (OAU)
took the position that existing territorial boundaries in Africa were to be
respected -- even though they constituted remnants of previous colonial
empires drawn with little respect for the distribution of ethnic groups.2S
Although some find this hypocritical, international law currently supports
the position that anti-colonial movements can invoke the right of self-deter-
20. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1,
para. 1,993 U.N.T.S. 3, S.
21. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
22. In some cases, this led to protracted fighting, as in the attempted Biafran secession. See generally
J. STREMLAu, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967-1970 (1977).
23. Thornberry, supra note 5, at 873.
24. [d. at 873-74.
25. Friedlander, Self-Determination:A Legal-PoliticalInquiry, in SELF DETERMINATION: NATIONAL,
REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 317 Ct. Alexander & R. Friedlander eds. 1980) [hereinafter SELF
DETERMINATION] (citing Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, member of the OAU Consultative Commillee,
on the Biafran secession movement). See also Mojekwu, Self-Determination: The African Perspective, id.
at 230; Mayall, Self-Determination and the OAU, in NATIONALISM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA (I. Lewis ed.
1983); Tiewul, Relations between the United Nations Organization and the Organization ofAfrican Unity
in the Settlement ofSecessionist Conflicts, 16 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 259 (1975).
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mination, but not groups seeking to secede from established states.26 Once
free of colonial rule, the newly established states become entitled to territo-
rial sovereignty.
While international law does not provide a right of secession, separat-
ists have nonetheless relied on particular provisions of international law in
making their secessionist claims. They have focused on the United Nations'
clear recognition of self-determination~while disregarding the accompany-
ing caveats that the principle does not supersede a state's territorial integri-
ty.27 But the self-determination argument potentially supports an unlimited
right to withhold individual consent to state authority. Proponents of seces-
sion therefore face a very slippery slope in formulating a right to secede
that does not open the door to complete anarchy. One way to limit the right
of self-determination is to claim that self-determination is appropriate for
nations or peoples, but not for minorities. 28 The issue then becomes whe-
ther the separatist group is a nation or a people.29 Another is to emphasize
that the right extends only to those groups subject to "alien" domination.3o
Effectively, these strategies require an inquiry into the extent to which
would-be secessionists constitute a true nation, especially whether they are
racially, linguistically, religiously, or ethnically distinct from the dominant
group in the existing state.31 In particular, self-determination claims have
often turned on questions of race or pigmentation.32
The debate over the validity of particular claims to secede is thus
framed in terms of the two generally recognized values of self-determina-
tion and territorial integrity. The difference between proponents and oppo-
nents of particular secessions lies in the relative priority they accord these
apparently competing values within specific contexts. The appeal of a
secessionist argument lies in the importance of self-determination, the links
between that principle and the concept of democratic self-government, and
the alleged moral superiority of self-determination over the preservation of
territorial boundaries. Ethnic distinctiveness plays an important role in
these arguments because the secessionist needs to limit the number of
26. See generally Thornberry, supra note 5, at 876, 887-89. Pomerance is among those who call this
a double standard. M. POMERANCE, supra note 3, at 42 (citing Emerson, The Fate ofHuman Rights in
the Third World, 27 WORLD POL. 201, 224 (1975).
27. See supra notes 5 & 11.
28. T. MASARYK, THE MAKING OF A STATE 386 (1927). These arguments are challenged in M.
POMERANCE, supra note 3, at 15.
29. M. POMERANCE, supra note 3, at 14.
30. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 5 (declaring that subjection of peoples to alien domination
violates UN Charter).
31. M. POMERANCE, supra note 3, at 16. See also M. SHAW, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRlCA 98
(1986); Nanda, Self-Detennination Outside the Colonial Context: The Binh ofBangladesh in Retrospect
in SELF DETERMINATION, supra note 25, at 202-03.
32. Mazrui, Consent, Colonialism, and Sovereignty, 11 POL. STUD. 36 (1963).
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groups entitled to claim a right to secede. Whether or not a positive law
right to secede can be established, such arguments have undeniable rhetori-
cal force.
Two important problems mark the way in which separatists frame their
claims. First, a straightforward appeal to principles of consent and self-
government cannot justify secession. Second, the alleged tension between
self-determination and territorial integrity rests on a misconception of the
principle of self-determination. These arguments overlap because both
concern the importance of territory to political governance. I will first
criticize the supposed link between secessionist claims and consent theory,
for this argument is far less controversial than the latter.
n. CONSENT, SELF-GOVERNMENT AND SELF-DETERMINATION
Traditionally, the self-determination norm on which secessionists base
their claims is thought to turn on democratic principles of consent and
popular sovereignty.33 According to this argument, self-determination rep-
resents a liberal democratic value (with secession as the liberal democratic
alternative), while the principle of territorial integrity remains feudal,
undemocratic, and oppressive. The idea that government must stem from
the consent of the governed seems to allow a disaffected group the right to
opt out of an existing state. If consent is the keystone of legitimacy, then a
non-consenting individual must be allowed to leave. In this way, principles
of democratic government translate into a right of secession. The only
countervailing principle, that of the territorial integrity of existing states,
suffers from a suspect historical association with monarchy and feudalism.
Therefore, so the argument goes, territoriality must give way to liberal
democratic principles and the right of self-determination.
The apparent simplicity of this position is misleading in at least one
important way; it places too much weight upon consent as the cornerstone
of state legitimacy. Despite the rhetoric of liberal democracy, actual con-
sent is not necessary to political legitimacy. Indeed, theorists have never
thought that a refusal to consent exempts an individual from state authority.
In the domestic context; actual consent rarely exists, and for this reason
political philosophers have fallen back on theories of tacit consent, argu-
ments which are fictitious. 34 Tacit consent theories do not crumble in the
face of a citizen's loud protest that a government cannot legitimately repre-
sent him or her. Consent makes up an important part of democratic rheto-
33. See, e.g., D. RONEN, supra note 10, at 6-9. This was also President Wilson's idea. A. COBBAN,
supra note 6, at 63.
34. See A. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 79 (1979).
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ric, but philosophers have managed to justify state power quite nicely
without actual consent. Separatists cannot base their arguments upon a right
to opt out because no such right exists in democratic theory.
Government by the consent of the governed does not necessarily en-
compass a right to opt out. It only requires that within the existing political
unit a right to participate through electoral processes be available. More-
over, participatory rights do not entail a right to secede. On the contrary,
they suggest that the approp~iate solution for dissatisfied groups rests in
their full inclusion in the polity, with full participation in its decision-mak-
ing processes.
Two lines of reasoning explain why one might erroneously link theories
of democratic participation with a right of secession. First, in some cases
in which secession is sought, the members of the separatist group are also
denied democratic participation rights. For example, inhabitants of most
colonies were denied both independence and electoral influence on the
decision-making processes of the colonizing state. This is not always the
case. In some contemporary secession movements, the polity accords mem-
bers of the minority group the same democratic rights as other citizens.3s
Yet separatists typically would not find satisfaction in rights of democratic
participation. What makes them separatists is their desire to leave and form
a new state. The fact that some states deny certain groups the right to
participate does not explain why secession, rather than full participation, is
the appropriate remedy.
The second line of reasoning linking consent to secession proposes that
denying a right of secession is directly contrary to the wishes of the sepa-
rati~t group, and thus a violation of the principle of popular sovereignty. If
one were to consult the secessionists, in many cases one would fmd a
desire to secede. How then can it be consis~entwith democracy to deny a
right to secede? The fallacy of this argument is obvious; it assumes that the
relevant individuals to consult are the members of the secessionist group.
In consulting the population of the entire state, one might find that a major-
ity overall wished to remain a single country. What has not been explained
is why only the separatists need be consulted. However, this cannot be
explained in terms of popular sovereignty or consent. As one author has
put it, who is the "self" in self-determination?36 Is it the minority group,
or is it the state as a whole?
35. For example, the Quebecois arguably possess the same democratic rights as other Canadians.
They presently enjoy the same rights to free expression, voting, and education. See THE CANADIAN
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, §§ 2, 3, pt. I, Constitution Act of 1982, sched. B, Canada Act
1982, ch. 11 (U.K. 1982).
36. M. POMERANCE, supra note 3, at 14-23.
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The separatist would argue that the relevant wishes are clearly those of
the secessionists themselves. Because it is their preferences that matter,
they have a right to withhold consent if they choose and, if they do, then
they have a right to secede. A separatist would probably concede that
individuals in the dominant ethnic group do not have a right to opt out.
They cannot escape political obligations by withholding consent from the
government, but if some minority ethnic group withholds consent then it
cannot be bound. The argument must be, in other words, that tacit consent
can be attributed to members of the dominant ethnic group in the state, but
not to members of the secessionist group. As to the latter, only actual
consent.will suffice.
This raises an argument about the proper unit within which democratic
government should operate, for the secessionists have assumed that there
are properly two governmental units, while opponents of secession assume
that there is only one. Both sides agree that a state has substantial power to
infer tacit consent from all those within the governmental unit, but has no
such power over those outside the unit. They disagree, however, over how
that unit should be defmed.
The separatist argument seems to propose that the governmental unit
ought to be defined in terms of ethnic or national groupings rather than
territory. This view defines political boundaries in terms of peoples. This
argument does not follow directly from democratic theory, for the seces-
sionist definition of governing units is no more democratic than the territo-
rial view. Neither argument is based on consent. Indeed, as Professor
Cobban argues, ethnic groupings are, if anything, less liberal and consen-
sual than territorial. While, for the most part, a person's residence remains
subject to choice, her ethnicity is fixed at birth.37 Under a territorial view,
one can, at least theoretically, withdraw consent simply by leaving the
territory. One's geographical location is more nearly voluntary than one's
ethnic identity. Democratic theory does not therefore compel the secession-
ist defmition.
Are governmental units better defined in terms of peoples, or in terms
of territory? This rephrasing of the separatist argument demonstrates the
oft-noted tension between people and territory. In the next section, I wish
to argue that the supposed tension is misconceived. Properly understood,
the principle of territorial sovereignty accommodates a right of secession
perfectly well, and indeed provides a better account of secessionist claims
than a self-determination principle defined in terms of the rights of peoples.
The reason is that the territorial principle does not necessarily give a state
37. A. COBBAN, supra note 6, at 115.
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power when its exercise of territorial sovereignty is illegitimate. If seces-
sionists argue that the current exercise of territorial power is illegitimate,
and that territorial sovereignty in fact belongs to the minority group rather
than to the majority, then the secessionists can base a right to secede upon
a territorial claim, rather than on a personalistic one. In other words, tacit
consent can be attributed to a state's inhabitant's only when the state has
legitimate power over its territory.38 I next illustrate the territorial version
of the separatist argument indirectly by comparing separatists with refu-
gees.
III. SEPARATISTS AND REFUGEES
Separatists are different from refugees, although both share a desire to
escape from a political system they find intolerable.39 Both wish to cut the
political ties that bind them to their current states, but they differ on the
method with which to cut those ties. Refugees seek to leave the state geo-
graphically. Secessionists also seek to leave the state, but mean to do so
without leaving physically for another location. Refugees abandon the land
that they currently inhabit. Secessionists intend to abandon their current
state, and in so doing, to take with them the land on which they live.
Intuitively, one views refugees very differently from secessionists. The
states that refugees abandon often are glad to see them leave. In some
circumstances states try to prevent an exodus,40 but ordinarily refugees
find it much easier to leave than do secessionists, who seek to take a tangi-
ble asset -- territory -- with them. Refugees generally do not have to show
that they constitute a people in order to justify to the world community
their desire to leave. The crucial question turns instead on whether they can
find another state willing to accept them.41 The refugees' choice alone
provides sufficient justification for cutting the political tie; their lack of
consent to their own government is the relevant issue.
Secessionists do not wish to leave their territory behind. They instead
typically seek to establish an independent state dominated by their own
culture, language or religion. This requires a new territorial base, both in
order to gain freedom from the dictates of some other culture and to com-
38. For further development of this argument, see L. BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYlNG INTERNATIONAL ACTS
(1989); see also Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 39 MINN. L. REv. 9 (1989).
39. The word refugee is used here in a non-technical sense; it is not limited to persons who would
qualify as such under international law, but also includes those driven out by economic pressures.
. 40. For many years the Soviet Union restricted the emigration ofSoviet Jews. For a general discussion
of Soviet restrictions on Jewish emigration, see P. STERN, WATER'S EDGE (1979).
41. For a discussion of the right to emigrate, see generally A. Dowry, CLOSED BORDERS: THE
CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON FREEDOM Or MOVEMENT (1987).
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pel visitors to respect the secessionists' way of life. In addition, secession-
ists often hold close attachments to particular parcels of land. Refugees
often flee to save their lives and in many cases are glad simply to escape.
However, the lives of secessionists are not generally in danger, and exit in
itself is not the objective. Although secessionist rhetoric may focus on free-
dom from domination by an alien culture, it does not achieve this goal
simply by abandoning land. An important element of the goal is the contin-
ued possession of a particular piece of land within which political rights
can be enjoyed.
For example, the three Baltic states of the Soviet Union -- Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia -- currently seek to leave the U.S.S.R. to establish
independent states.42 While many citizens of these republics desire free-
dom from Soviet domination, they do not intend to purchase it at the cost
of leaving their homelands. The central government in Moscow vigorously
objects to their claims. Secession would do more than remove the citizens
of these three states from Soviet control; it would remove one of the most
economically productive areas of the Soviet Union and limit strategic ac-
cess to the Baltic Sea.43 In practice, the local languages and cultures of
the three Baltic states could not be protected through mass emigration. For
these reasons, their goal is to secede.
By choosing secession rather than emigration, secessionists assume a
duty of justification that refugees need not bear. Secessionists must some-
how establish a claim to the territory on which they would found their new
state. Such claims to territory do not flow automatically from ethnic dis-
tinctiveness. Groups that are ethnically distinct, but possess no independent
territorial claims, have very poor chances of convincing anyone of their
right to secede. Imagine, for example, a group of recent immigrants com-
ing to a particular state in order to engage in commerce or to find jobs.
Even if this group is ethnically quite distinct, it cannot establish the requi-
site claim to territory simply by migrating to an already inhabited area and
settling there. Indian nationals in East Africa and Turkish workers in Ger-
many may have much to complain about but, despite their differentiation
from the surrounding culture, they cannot claim that this gives them a right
to secede. This is not to say that maltreatment is justified because these
groups lack a territorial base. But the remedy for maltreatment is better
treatment by the current government, not permission to set up a new state
in the same location. Maltreatment alone does not give rise to a territorial
claim; such claims must be independently established.
42. For a discussion of the political situation in the Baltic states, with primary focus on Lithuania,
see Olcott, The Lithuanian Crisis, 69 FOREIGN AFF. 30 (1990).
43. ld. at 46.
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The rhetoric of consent obscures the importance of territorial claims.
Consent theory seems to suggest that the only important factor is whether
an individual chooses to be part of the existing state. This rhetoric does not
distinguish, however, between those who may avoid state authority only by
leaving and those who may avoid state authority while remaining where
they are. By failing to acknowledge explicitly the importance of territory,
the self-determination principle projects this error into the international
arena. Groups are said to have a right to popular sovereignty in that they
should not be subject to domination by an alien culture. But popular sover-
eignty fails to explain why a minority group may avoid alien domination by
taking a portion of the existing state's territory with it as it escapes state
power. This territorial remedy for alien domination must be justified by
territorial arguments.
IV. THE HISTORICAL GRIEVANCE
Most secessionist movements claim that a territorial justification exists.
They argue that they have a right to the particular piece of land on which
they seek to establish their nation-state. My point is not to disagree with
this claim. To the contrary, I simply argue that this territorial right repre-
sents an important part of their claim that must be made explicit, and that
its relevance should be recognized under international law.
The typical secessionist claim couples an argument about ethnic distinc-
tiveness with an historical claim to a particular piece of land. As a theoreti-
cal matter, other approaches may establish territorial claims. As Professor
Allen Buchanan has argued, one can imagine territorial claims not founded
upon an historical grievance.44 But the most intuitively appealing and di-
rect territorial claims that one encounters typically have historical origins.
The land properly belongs to the secessionist group, so the argument goes,
and only came under the dominion of the existing state by way of some
unjustifiable historic event.
The Baltic states provide an excellent example of such an historical
grievance. In 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union signed a secret,
pact, placing the Baltic states within the Soviet Union's sphere of influ-
ence.4S At that time, the three states were independent nations.46 Shortly
44. Buchanan, Toward a Theory ofSecession, 1991 ETmcs 362, 370-73.
45. For a discussion of the making of the secret protocol, see I. DEUTSCHER, STALIN 435-41 (1967).
46. President Wilson's advocacy ofself-determination under the framework of his "Fourteen Points"
helped the three nations establish their independence following World War I. For a description of the
history ofeach nation during this period of independence, see LITHUANIA: 700 YEARS 145-313 (A. Gerutis
ed. 1969); V. MANGULIS, LATVIA IN THE WARS OF THE TwENTIETH CENTURY 18-80 (1983); T. RAUN,
EsrONIA AND THE EsroNIANS 99-149 (1987). '
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thereafter, the Soviet Union annexed them. Germany subsequently occupied
the states and the Soviet Union recaptured them in 1944.47 The Soviet
Union has now reluctantly acknowledged the role of the secret protocol,
but declines to offer complete and immediate independence to the three
states.48 The ultimate resolution of the controversy remains to be deter-
mined. For present purposes, the important feature is the close connection
between the historical grievance and the current secessionist demands.
At least two types of arguments can be used to demonstrate that current
state boundaries are illegitimate and that secessionists have a superior claim
to the land they seek. The fIrst proposes that the land was acquired through
conquest by the state from which the ethnic group wishes to secede. The
example of the Baltic republics illustrates how separatists may base a claim
to territory upon a charge of improper annexation. In this type of historical
grievance, the currently dominant state from which the separatist group
wishes to secede is responsible, it is alleged, for improperly including the
group's land base into its own. The wrongdoer is thus the currently domi-
nant state.
A second argument concentrates on a wrongdoing committed by a third
party. At some previous point in history, a state with no current stake in
the dispute improperly joined the territories of the currently dominant state
and the separatist group. This type of wrongdoing occurred when the Euro-
pean colonial powers fIxed colonial borders to suit their own convenience,
and then left the borders intact when their empires receded. Great Britain,
for example, was partly responsible for drawing borders in such a way as
to place East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh) and West Pakistan within
one state. However, by the time the war of secession had begun, Great
Britain was no longer involved in the dispute and the fIghting took place
between two other entities, neither one of which had acted illegitimately in
the original ten;itorial division. The ethnic diversity of many modern Afri-
can nations is similarly a vestige of previous colonial divisions.
I argue below that it may matter in some cases which scenario led to
the current state of affairs. But in both scenarios, secessionist movements
are based upon some sort of historical grievance over territory. Separatists
typically tell a story about how their group was wrongfully or mistakenly
included in the present state. While the rhetoric of popular sovereignty
does not em~hasize the importance of territorial claims, such claims are
47. Soviet historians have preferred to view the events of 1944 not as a recapture, but as a liberation
of the three republics from the German invaders. See, e.g., A. Voss, LENIN'S BEHESTS AND THE MAKINO
OF SOVIET LATVIA 70 (1970).
48. Upheaval in the East: Soviet Congress Condemns '39 Pactthat Led to Annexation ofBaltics, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 25, 1989, at AI, col. 2 (late ed.).
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clear enough to the participants. Secessionists have strongly held beliefs
about the moral imperative of their territorial claims, preferring to stand
and fight rather than simply to leave.
This analysis identifies one major defect of the standard account of self-
determination, namely its insufficient focus on the history of the dispute. 49
A secessionist claim based on nothing other than the rights of existing
peoples to have their own nations would concentrate on the issue of wheth-
er an identifiable group constituted a people, and whether the group was
subject to alien subjugation. The claim would be based on a snapshot of the
existing ethnic map and would take into account little more than the present
distribution of ethnic and cultural identity. If United Nations norms are
taken literally, then Turkish guest workers in Germany have claims on par
with black Africans fighting colonial powers. So static a view of the divi-
sion of a society into peoples cannot fully capture an important normative
feature of separatists' demands, namely that the asserted historical griev-
ance confers on it the right to a particular territory. The standard account
neglects the fact that separatists typically seek to right historical wrongs.
V. THE CONTINUING ROLE OF ETHNICITY
This interpretation of the typical separatist argument focuses squarely
on a feature of the controversy that has no direct bearing on the ethnic,
religious, or racial differences between the group that wishes to secede and
the majority group that controls the existing state. Does this mean that
ethnic claims are irrelevant under a territorial interpretation of secessionist
movements? If so, the territorial version of the separatist argument appears
inconsistent with current legal statements, which bestow the right of self-
determination only on peoples. But ethnic identity is not irrelevant under a
territorialist interpretation, for it explains why historical grievances contin-
ue to matter. The territorial interpretation recognizes a significant role for
claims of ethnic distinctiveness, although not the role suggested by the .
standard account.
The important function of ethnic identity under the territorial interpreta-
tion is to explain how territorial claims survive, and why particular individ-
uals currently feel aggrieved by past events. Unjust historical occurrences
do not automatically give rise to contemporary movements to right past
wrongs. Individuals are typically motivated to become involved in seces-
sionist movements because they identify in some way with those who were
49. For example, the United Nations documents cited in note 5 supra do not base a right to self-
determination upon historical claims.
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unjustly treated in the past. Without a reason to identify with the earlier
possessors of the territory, the separatists would simply remain disengaged
observers. While some might perceive that earlier victims of colonial ag-
gression were unfairly treated, no impetus for action would exist unless a
current group identified with those losers and considered itself the heir to
their territorial claims. If no such group exists, there are few persons moti-
vated to fight and most probably no one to whom the territory can be
returned.
Ethnic identification keeps the historical grievance alive by passing the
loss from one generation to the next. Old wrongs will not be forgotten so
long as an existing group continues to experience the historical wrongs as
its own, as part of its heritage. The usual modes of transmission of this
shared sense of wrong are precisely the ones that typically define ethnic
communities. Wrongs are passed down by recitation within the family,
through educational and religious institutions, and by way of shared cul-
ture, such as stories, myths, nationalistic songs, and the like.so If at any
point an individual should ask, "Why should I care about the past?" the
answer follows that "These are your people who were wronged. You are
one of us, and we all share this wrong and ought to struggle to make it
right." If one were as likely to identify with the winners as the losers, then
there would be little reason to feel resentment or to fight. Ethnicity answers
the question, "Why do people still care about something that occurred such
a long time ago?" It constitutes the barrier to assimilation and the guarantee
that historical grievances will continue to be relevant in the present day. It
gives the current claimants their standing to protest, not in a technical, but
in an emotional sense.
VI. Two ANOMALIES EXPLAINED
My thesis is that every separatist movement is built upon a claim to
territory, usually based on an historical grievance, and that without a nor-
matively sound claim to territory, self-determination arguments do not form
a plausible basis for secession. Self-determination proves a misleading way
to characterize the issue because it focuses attention exclusively on people,
50. By keeping language and culture alive, nationalists preserve their sense of historical grievance.
See, e.g., W. CONNOR, supra note 15, at 254-63 (discussing Soviet language policy). In one illustration
of this, Poland's Solidarity and Lithuania's nationalist Sajudis movement held a youth rally on both sides
of the Polish-Lithuanian border to commemorate the fifty-first anniversary of the secret protocol that
relegated the Baltic states and Poland to the Soviet sphere of influence. The Polish and Lithuanian youths
went to mass together in the Lithuanian town of Lazdija, and later attended pop music concerts. Old and
new culture combined to reaffirm the historical grievance in the minds ofthe young. Solidarity and Sajudis
Observe Ribbentrop-Mo!otov Pact, U.P.!. News, Aug. 23, 1990.
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not on places. That is not to say that territorial claims are necessary for
every kind of minority claim. If a minority experiences discrimination or
suffers human rights violations, then it certainly has a grievance even
though it claims no historical right to a particular piece of territory. I ar-
gue, however, that the minority cannot justifiably claim the remedy of
secession unless it can convincingly assert a claim to territory. What distin-
guishes separatist from other minority claims is the fact that the group
wishes to establish a new state on a particular piece of land.
Furthermore, whether a territorial claim exists may prove a better
indicator of intuitively acceptable secessionist claims than either the ethnic
identities or the preferences of the inhabitants. What are characterized as
self-determination claims are instead sometimes simple territorial disputes.
Claims are at times framed in terms of self-determination where there
exists no ethnic group aspiring to secession, and secessionist claims are
sometimes denied even when such an ethnic group exists. From the per-
spective of the standard account of self-determination, such cases are ano-
malous. A claim should stand or fall depending on whether an identifiable
people is protesting for the right of self-determination. First let us look at
the way that a territorial claim, unaccompanied by a claim on behalf of an
aggrieved people, sometimes gives rise to a self-determination argument.
Occasionally, states make self-determination claims on behalf of groups
of individuals that have not in fact expressed a wish to exercise their sup-
posed right of self-determination. This anomaly suggests that the self-deter-
mination of peoples is not the real issue. For example, India cited the norm
of self-determination in ousting the Portuguese from Goa, which Portugal
had acquired as a colony.51 This claim was made despite the fact that the
people then inhabiting Goa had not been asked whether they wished to
repudiate Portuguese rule. India maintained that the preferences of the
people of Goa were simply irrelevant. From the perspective of the standard
account, the Indian claim seems puzzling. How can India force the people
of Goa to exercise their right of self-determination without first consulting
the Goans to determine what they themselves might want? From the terri-
torial perspective, the claim becomes considerably more intelligible. The
Indian claim was an historical one about rights to territory. From the Indi-
an government's perspective, Portugal had acquired the land improperly
and had no legitimate claim to it. India sought to 'redress what it saw as an
historical wrong, although the rhetoric used to explain its anti-colonial
stance proved ill-adapted to the task because it focused on the self-determi-
nation rights of the inhabitants.
51. This and other examples of similar claims are cited in M. POMERANCE, supra note 3, at 20.
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Self-determination claims that are disguised as territorial claims are not
uncommon. When the people of Mayotte indicated a preference to remain
with France rather than join the other Comoro islands in forming a separate
republic, one might assume that the General Assembly resolution guaran-
teeing their right of self-determination would have protected that prefer-
ence; it, unfortunately, did not.52 Argentina sought to wrest the Falklands
(Malvinas) from Great Britain despite the fact that the inhabitants preferred
continued British rule.53 Spain, likewise, has challenged British control
over Gibraltar without regard to the wishes of the inhabitants. 54
Some secessionist groups, furthermore, have slender support from the
groups they claim to represent. For instance, only eighteen percent of the
Basques are said to support secession from Spain.5s It would seem that
self-determination in such contexts serves as nothing more than a mandate
for righting territorial wrongs. As one author notes with regard to Puerto
Rico, what seems to matter is not what the people want but whether the
situation is tainted with the lIoriginal sinll of colonialism. 56
The problem in conducting plebiscites when the population's ethnic
composition has changed over time also suggests that territory, and not the
preferences of the people, is the real issue. The French claimed Alsace-
Lorraine, for example, on historical grounds, but resisted a plebiscite after
the end of World War I because a large number of Germans had replaced
French inhabitants while the territory was under German control. Clearly,
the French claim was by its nature territorial and the French considered the
preferences of the current inhabitants ~material. 57 A theory of self-deter-
mination that focuses on people cannot easily explain this result, but a
territorial interpretation explains the French position. Intuitively, a self-
determination claim cannot be made against the actual wishes of the in-
52. M. POMERANCE, supra note 3, at 31; M. SHAW, supra note 31, at 115. It was argued that the
islands fonned a single territorial unit, and thus should all be granted independence together. This theory
does not explain why the territorial unity of the Comoros mattered, but that of the French Empire did not.
The obvious explanation relies on the history ofthe dispute in that France was seen as a colonial aggressor.
53. See generally L. GUSTAFSON, THE SOVEREIGNTY DISPurE OVER THE FALKLAND (MALVlNAS)
ISLANDS (1988). In chapter 2, Gustafson discusses the role ofself-detennination in the dispute, noting how
the principle came in conflict with the goal of decolonization. Id.
54. M. SHAW, supra note 31, at 136-37. See M. POMERANCE, supra note 3, at 30 (noting opposition
to holding a referendum in Gibraltar).
55. Moderates Win, The Independent, Oct. 30, 1990, at 10. See also Carter, Ethnic Minority Groups
and Self-Determination: The Case ofthe Basques, 20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 55, 80 (1986).
56. M. POMERANCE, supra note 3, at 27.
57. A. COBBAN, supra note 6, at 72. Cobban describes the French position sympathetically. One way
to describe the problem that seems more in line with the standard self-detennination account would be to
insist that people matter, but then require that plebiscites include only the "right" people. Unfortunately,
the decision about which people it is "right" to include reflects primarily one's intuitions about the
ownership rights to territory.
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habitants. The problem arises because the issue is misleadingly labelled one
of self-determination.
If a territorial grievance alone can create a plausible self-determination
claim, then the wish to secede on the part of a distinct people is not a
necessary condition of the validity of the claim to secede. The second
anomaly under the standard account of self-determination turns on whether
status as a people ought to be sufficient. As noted earlier,58 the usual self-
determination norms require that the claimant constitute a distinct people.
Otherwise any and all groups would possess a right to secede and the result
would be anarchy. But even if some group qualifies as a people, the intu-
itive distinction between separatists and refugees reveals that some peoples
are entitled to territory and others are not. Because the right to secede is a
function of a territorial claim rather than the existence of a distinct people,
the latter factor is clearly not sufficient.
A second argument supports the conclusion that status as a distinct
people may not be sufficient to trigger a right to secede. This approach
concerns the position of African states with regard to secessionist move-
ments within their own territory. I noted earlier that many Europeans
considered the position of the African states to be hypocritical because
these states relied upon self-determination norms to throw off colonial
power, but then denied their own minorities a right to break away in
turn.59 From the territorial point of view, however, there is more logic to
the African states' position than would fIrst appear.
The logic depends on the existence and extent of an historical griev-
ance. Clearly, in the eyes of many observers, colonialism is perceived as
an unqualified evil; it represents a generally accepted violation of the self-
determination norm. In contrast, greater controversy surrounds the question
of rights of separation in noncolonial situations. 6o From the perspective of
the rights of peoples, however, it is not clear why this should be the case.
Why should it matter whether the majority group exercising dominion over
an ethnically distinct people is or is not a colonial power? I suggest, as an
explanation, the fact that the historical grievance is particularly clear in
colonial situations.
The standard international norms of self-determination cannot explain
the distinctive status of colonialism because they fail to take into account
the fact that liberation movements seek to right past territorial wrongs.
Colonialism represents a special case because the colonial powers were
58. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
60. M. POMERANCE, supra note 3, at 28 ("[1]f there is ajus cogens in matters of self-determination,
it consists of decolonization").
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particularly lacking in justification for their original territorial conquest.
Colonial powers possessed no colorable claims to the territories they con-
quered. Once conquered, the colonies were not incorporated into the nation
but were retained as overseas possessions.61
Mere ethnic distinctiveness cannot by itself explain why colonialism is
worse than cases in which minorities are subject to majority rule. If self-
determination claims are interpreted as claims about territory, however,
then it is clear that a colonial power should always yield to such claims.
The same cannot be said when a self-determination claim is raised against a
noncolonial power. Noncolonial powers sometimes come to have physical
power over territory by means other than conquest. Indeed, the emerging
nations of Africa and Asia inherited power over their territories through
methods that might be considered entirely legitimate, even though the
territories included ethnically diverse groups. Often a wide variety of peo-
ple banded together to fight the colonial power, and joined forces voluntari-
ly in the formation of the newly independent state. Consider as an example
the history of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.62 As the British colonial
period drew to a close, Muslim inhabitants of the area came to insist upon
partition from India, which was largely Hindu. At independence, the land
was divided into two states, namely India, and East and West Pakistan.
The East Pakistanis became increasingly dissatisfied with domination by the
West Pakistanis, from whom they were linguistically and culturally distinct.
After wide-spread human rights abuses and a brief civil war (in which
India intervened), East Pakistan successfully broke away from West Paki-
stan to form the independent state of Bangladesh.
The Bengali's claim against West Pakistan, while phrased in terms of
self-determination, in fact differed from the claims Indians and Pakistanis
had raised against Great Britain. Great Britain was a colonial power and it
was impossible to create a colorable argument that its territorial sovereignty
over the subcontinent was legitimate under international law. Pakistan's
dominion over East Pakistan was of a different order. The process by
which Pakistan was created was not tainted by conquest in the same way as
Britain's acquisition of the subcontinent. Indeed, East Pakistan actively
participated in the formation of Pakistan by joining in the resistance against
Great Britain and the partition of the subcontinent into two separate na-
tions. None of this, it should be added, necessarily denies the East
Pakistanis' claims to secede. They had suffered serious human rights abus-
61. Although the French policy of assimilation accorded citizenship to some inhabitants of
conquered territories, the privilege was hard to acquire and without much practical value. See, e.g., E.
MORTIMER, FRANCE AND THE AFRICANS 1944-1960, 36-39 (1969).
62. On the problem of Bangladesh, see generally Nanda, supra note 31.
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es and had little prospect of a better life in the future. But this constitutes
an additional factor above and beyond usual secessionist arguments; it
would not have been necessary to show this if the situation had been a
colonial one.
Many African nations currently experiencing ethnic strife came to hold
dominion over their ethnic minorities in a similar manner. Upon indepen-
dence, the minority group was simply included within the territorial juris-
diction of the newly created state. This did not necessarily involve any
injustice by the dominant ethnic group. Indeed, in some cases the 'minority
itself welcomed inclusion in the new nation as part of the process of inde-
pendence. It is not due to prejudice against the colonial powers that self-
determination claims have been more persuasive in an anti-colonial context.
The historical grievance is different when the state from which separation
is sought was responsible for wrongfully including the minority in the fIrst
place. This is true whether we are speaking of colonial' powers, such as the
European states in Africa, or of other states that acquired territory through
conquest, such as the Soviet Union in its acquisition of the Baltic states.
Self-determination claims can be ranked on a spectrum, depending upon
the extent to which inclusion of the claimants' territory was wrongfully
brought about by the current majority group. While it may be difficult to
know where on the spectrum to draw the line between normatively valid
and normatively invalid claims, a fair amount of agreement would likely
emerge about where to place particular cases, and colonialism would prob-
ably be at one extreme of the spectrum. Noncolonial situations, such as
Bangladesh, need additional arguments to support secessionist claims, such
as the existence of widespread human rights abuses. For this reason, it is
not hypocritical for newly emer~ing nations to regard colonialism differ-
ently than other secessionist problems.
VII. COMPARING THE KEy ISSUES OF THE SELF-DETERMINATION AND
TERRITORIAL APPROACHES
What difference does it make whether one adopts a standard version of
the self-determination argument or the territorial interpretation? Under the
standard account, certain questions are determinative. Under the territorial
interpretation, a different set of questions must be addressed in order to
evaluate the merits of a separatist movement. Both sets of questions are
difficult to resolve. However, they focus on different issues, so we should
compare the relevant issues under one approach to the relevant issues of
the other.
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I have already alluded to the most important question under the stan-
dard account: whether the group in question really constitutes a separate
people or whether it is merely a minority gr9uP within the state. Only in
the former case is the separatist movement justified. But on what does this
question of nationality turn? Nationality has proven notoriously difficult to
defme. In part, it is assumed to be a subjective characteristic.63 In other
words, a group constitutes a nationality because it perceives itself as such.
While there may be something important to this insight, in practice this
standard proves elusive. One reason is that it is not clear whether potential-
ly self-serving descriptions of subjective beliefs ought to be taken at face
value. The perception of ethnic distinctiveness may simply flow from in-
flamed passions. In addition, it remains unclear what to do when the inhab-
itants disagree.
Another problem is that the subjective approach does not help individu-
als d~termine for themselves the legitimacy of their desire to secede. For
example, assume that French Canadian voters are trying to decide whether
they ought to support separatism. Under a subjective theory, their decision
depends on whether they believe they constitute a separate people and are
therefore entitled to secede. A definition of peoples that places too much
weight on subjective beliefs about national distinctiveness is unhelpful
because the voters' problem is precisely that they are attempting to deter-
mine whether or not to believe they have a right to secede. A theory of
whether secession is appropriate ought to help the participants themselves
evaluate whether they constitute a "mere" minority or a distinct nationality.
A subjective definition cannot fulfill this function, because it tells individu-
als to consult their own subjective beliefs when the issue is precisely what
beliefs the individuals ought to have.
The more objective factors that have been considered in ascertaining
nationality include racial differences (e.g., differences of color), religious
differences, economic differences, and linguistic and cultural differenc-
es.64 Although these differences are somewhat objective, the importance
attached to them varies from one situation to another. What seems like a
minor difference in one situation may loom larger in another. In pre-colo-
nial Africa, local groups were often willing to unite to fight colonial pow-
ers, only to fight among themselves as soon as the colonials were driven
out and ethnic rivalries resurfaced. Such problems with defining nationality
63. According to Cobban, "[t]he best we can say is that any territorial community, the members of
which are conscious of themselves as members of a community, and wish to maintain the identity of theIr
community, is a nation." A. COBBAN, supra note 6, at 107.
64. Nanda, supra note 31, at 205, analyzes the claim of East Pakistan to independence in terms of
racial, cultural, linguistic, and economic differences. See also Friedlander, supra note 25, at 315.
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are obvious and well documented,65 and they bode ill for attempts to de-
fine a quantum of ethnic difference that would justify secession.
A territorial analysis focuses, in contrast, on territorial equities. A
theory of secession necessarily depends upon a theory of legitimate sover-
eignty over territory. Separatists are typically motivated by a perceived
historical injustice, in which land that was rightfully theirs was taken by
another group. The land was seized either by the dominant group in the
current state, or by a third group which then conveyed the territory to the
currently dominant group. In evaluating the persuasiveness of separatists'
arguments, it is necessary to investigate these historical claims. This may
be no easy matter, for in many cases the facts will be in dispute. In few
cases will the equities point unambiguously in one direction.66
Even if an historically sound evaluation is possible, this will not end the
inquiry. A key remaining issue is the extent to which the status quo should
be altered to rectify past wrongs. This could be called the problem of
"adverse possession." Few would say that the status quo deserves no
weight at all. Even a separatist is likely to concede (albeit reluctantly) that
the status quo is sometimes important. The separatist group may itself have
come by the territory in question through dubious means. By raising its
historical claim the group may be relying upon a previous status quo and
ignoring still earlier historical wrongs that had been committed. Even
where this is not the case because the separatist group is indigenous to the
area, it would seem quite impossible to put everything up for grabs. Hardly
a territorial boundary anywhere in the world would survive an effort to
correct aU historical misdeeds. If protecting the status quo must be bal-
anced against rectifying past injustices, then the obvious question is how
much weight to assign each concern. Here, I can only suggest a few of the
factors that might be taken into account in determining whether the status.
quo is currently settled enough to give rise to a defense of "adverse posses-
sion."
One obvious factor might be the immediacy of the historical grievance.
The further in the past the historical wrong occurred, the more likely that it
is better now to let things remain as they are..At one extreme, if an illegit-
imate annexation occurred only a few months earlier, the proper remedy
would be to return the territory to its rightful inhabitants. Certainly, the
Kuwaitis would suggest as much. Separatists, undoubtedly, are willing to
65. See, e.g., E. GELLNERR, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 53-62 (1983); A. COBBAN, supra note 6,
at 107.
66. For discussions ofthe difficulties in establishinga theory ofterritory, see generaIly L. BRILMAYER,
JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS 52-78 (1989); Khatehadourian, Criteria ofTerritorialRights ofPeoples
and Nations, and Reiman, Can Nations Have Moral Rights to Territory? in THE TERRITORIAL RIGms OF
NATIONS AND PEOPLES (J. Jacobson ed. 1989).
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go back a good deal farther in time. The question is, how long an historical
reach is warranted?
Another factor might be the extent to which the separatist group has
kept the claim alive. Some groups have managed to keep their controversy
alive in world public opinion. In such cases, there has been no adverse
possession because the minority group has never acquiesced in the loss of
its territory. Expectations cannot become settled around new state bound-
aries when there are constant reminders of the historical illegitimacy of the
annexation. The primary problem with including this factor is that it penal-
izes groups that have been unable to keep their protest alive because of
severe repression. Perhaps in such circumstances, where continued struggle
is virtually impossible, the lack of public efforts should not be held against
the separatist claim. Another problem with relying on this factor is that
publicity is often sought through rather dubious methods, such as bombing
airplanes; it might be undesirable to reward such activities.
A third factor, also controversial, is the extent to which the territory
has now been settled by members of the dominant group. It is a common
strategy to attempt to solidify conquest by moving loyal citizens of the
victorious state into the new territory. In the Baltic states, for instance,
only twenty percent of the residents of Lithuania are non-Lithuanians, but
the analogous percentages for Latvia and Estonia are forty-eight and thirty-
nine, respectively.67 I mentioned this strategy earlier as causing problems
with plebiscites under the standard account, but it also generates problems
under a territorial analysis. From the point of view of separatists, such new
settlement ought to have no significance whatsoever. They did not ask for
these new inhabitants. Had the secessionists' territory not been improperly
annexed, the newcomers could have been excluded entirely. Taking the
newcomers' presence into account compounds the original injury. Yet, as a
practical matter, the new settlers tend to legitimize the territorial status
quo. The reason that members of the separatist group often resist such '
migration is precisely because they realize that it undercuts their claim in
the forum of world opinion.
Finally, the nature of the historical grievance may itself figure in deter-
mining whether a right of secession still exists. As suggested earlier, there
are degrees of wrongfulness. The determination is neither black nor white.
It is probably no coincidence that the one case on which most people can
agree is the decolonization of the empires of the European powers. The
European powers' acquisitions lacked even colorable justification. In con-
trast, some territorial disputes involve uncertain territorial claims in which
67. Olcott, supra note 42, at 43.
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a genuine dispute exists over the proper ownership of the land. If the
"wrong" state wins the contest through use of force, this is an historical
grievance. But such victory is qualitatively different than naked conquest,
and for this reason might be thought to establish a claim of adverse posses-
sion once a period of time goes by. Good faith may also matter. The de-
gree to which the prevailing party has a sincere belief in a right to the .
territory may perhaps be inferred from its behavior once the territory is
annexed. The European powers, of course, treated their colonies as colo-
nies, giving them a distinct political status and treating the inhabitants as
subjects rather than as fellow citizens. One would expect that if a victo-
rious state believes it has a pre-existing claim to the territory, then in an-
nexing the territory it will treat the new land in the same way that it treats
other parts of its domain.
Vill. CONCLUSION
Clearly, the territorial interpretation of separatist movements does not
supply easy answers to the problem of secession. The question of what
amounts to a good claim for maintaining the existing status quo seems
especially difficult. Adverse possession claims are hard to evaluate.
I would submit, however, that under the territorial view we would at
least be asking more of the right questions. Separatist movements cannot be
understood or evaluated without reference to claims to territory. Groups do
not seek to secede merely because they are ethnically distinct, and if they
did, they would probably not get much support. It is hard even to under-
stand what a separatist group would demand absent historical claims to
territory. When a group seeks to secede, it is claiming a right to a particu-
lar piece of land, and one must necessarily inquire into why it is entitled to
that particular piece of land, as opposed to some other piece of land -- or
to no land at all.
The standard account pits the principle of self-determination against the
principle of territorial integrity. The first assumes government is defined as
a collection of individuals; the latter, as an area of land. Defming govern-
ment in terms of land better explains what secessionists are trying to ac-
complish. When individuals seek to secede, they are making a claim to
territory. They wish a piece of land for their future, a piece of land on
which they will be able to make their own claims of integrity of territorial
borders. Their claim is typically centered on a piece of land that they
possessed in the past, and upon which they claimed territorial integrity.
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Territorial integrity properly understood accommodates the principle of
self-determination. Whatever conflict exists is not between principles, but
over land.
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